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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The interpretation of the following Statutes and Rules is
beheved to be determinative of the issues addressed in Point VI. A
of this brief.
UCA§57-4a-4(l) (d):
(1) A recorded document creates the following presumptions
regarding title to the real property affected:
*
*

(d) delivery occurred notwithstanding any lapse of time
between dates on the document and the date of recording.
Rule 52 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or
with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and
state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be
entered pursuant to Rule 5 8A; in granting or refusing interlocutory
injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and
conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action.
Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review.
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall
be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility
of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the
court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court. It
will be sufficient if the findings of facts and conclusions of law are
stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the
evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed
by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule
41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of
the ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b),
50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more than one
ground.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MARK JACOBS,

]

Plaintiff/Appellant,

]
])

vs.

WILFORD L. HAFEN and JO ANN B. ]
HAFEN, his wife
]
•
Defendants/Appellees.
)

Case No. 930023-CA

Priority No. 16

BRIEF OF APPELLEES

I.

JURISDICTION

The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to
U.C.A. §78-2-2 (1953, as amended).
jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A.

II.

The Utah Court of Appeals has

§78-2a-3(2)(k)(1953, as amended).

ISSUES ON APPEAL

Did the trial court err in quieting title to property under the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, where the deed segregating title to
the property parcels was executed in 1973, and recorded in 1983.
1.

Mr. Jacobs challenges

the sufficiency

of the

evidence

supporting the trial court's finding that separate ownership of the property
had been established in 1973.
2.

Mr. Jacobs contends that the trial court committed error in

concluding that one element of boundary by acquiescence, i.e., "for a long
1

period of time", had been met, because it was for eighteen-and-one-half
years.
The Appeals Court reviews factual findings of the trial court,
giving great deference

to the trial court's view of the evidence.

A

presumption arises concerning the validity of the trial court's findings and
judgment.

The appeals court will set aside such factual findings only if

they are clearly against the weight of the evidence, clearly erroneous, or
induced

by an erroneous view of the law.

Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P2d

1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); Jeppson v. Jeppson. 684 P2d 69, 70 (Utah 1984);
State in Interest of K.K.H.. 610 P2d 849, 851 (Utah, 1980); Smith v. Linmar
Energy Corp.. 790 P2d 1222, 1224 (Utah App 1990); Schindler v. Schindler.
776 P2d 84, 88 (Utah App 1989); Jensen v. Brown. 639 P2d 150, 152 (Utah
1981); URCP, Rule 52 (a).
The trial court's determination
reviewed

for

correctness.

Where

as to the applicable law is

there

is

substantial,

competent,

admissible evidence to support the conclusions reached, the appeals court
will not disturb the conclusions.

The evidence and the inferences

that

fairly and reasonably are drawn therefrom must be viewed in a light most
favorable to the judgment entered.

Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P2d at 1070,

1071; Bush v. Coult. 594 P2d 865, 866 (Utah 1979); Van Dvke v. Chappell.
818 P2d 1023, 1024 (Utah 1991); Nielsen v. Chin-Hsien
512, 514 (Utah 1980); Reimschiissel

v.

Wang; 613 P2d

Russell. 649 P2d 26, 27 (Utah

1982).
III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Opposing Counsel's statement of the nature of the case is
accurately

reflected.
2

IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS
In addition

to Mr. Jacobs' statement of facts, the

Hafens

believe the following facts or clarifications are necessary for an adequate
review of this matter.
1.
when

Castle

The Hafens claim
Creek

Properties

of title dates back to April 15, 1973,
executed

a

Warranty

Deed

Investment Company, Inc., and Joe Hutchings. Trial exhibit 18.
affected

to

E&F

(this deed

the property in sections 35 and 36, and is reproduced in the

Addendum).
2.

E&F Investment Company, Inc. and Joe Hutchings conveyed

the same property, by two separate warranty deeds to Santa Clara Heights,
Inc., on April 1, 1979. Trial exhibits 16 and 17.
3.

Santa

Clara

Heights,

Inc. conveyed

the

warranty deed to Wilford L. Hafen on October 21, 1982.

property

by

Trial exhibit 15.

Mr Jacobs' brief, at page 4, and the trial transcript at page 42, indicate that
the Hafens purchased this property in October, 1988.
error, as the deed is dated October, 21 1982

This is an apparent

and recorded January, 31

1981.
4.

The deed Mr. Jacobs states conveyed property in all four

sections from Castle Creek Properties to Security Title Company on April 9,
1981, (see Mr. Jacobs' brief at page 6), only conveyed the Kane County
property in sections one and two.
5.

See Tr. 30 and Trial exhibit 2.

Mr. Jacobs' surveyor had surveyed the area in 1979, 1985

and in 1992. Tr. 19; Findings of Fact No. 8.
6.

This area of property is known as the Swapp Pasture and is

3

entirely fenced.

All the surrounding area is open range and has no fences,

except along the highway. Tr. 43-44.
7.

The property was used basically for grazing from 1952 to

the present. Tr. 46-47.
8.

Mr. Hafen was never asked by anyone not to use the entire

fenced area. Tr. 46, 53-54.
9.

Title companies had been utilized during this time.

title companies were in Mr. Jacobs' chain of title.

Two

Findings of Fact No. 9, Tr.

30-31, Trial exhibits 2 and 4.
10.

Each of the trial courts specific Findings of Fact are

incorporated herein, and are included in the Addendum.
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A,
separate

The

ownership

evidence
of

the

was

sufficient

property

was

to

establish

established

in

that
April,

1973.
The trial court found that separate ownership was established
in 1973 as to three of the four parcels and earlier for the Section two
property, and that the acquiescence was for a sufficiently
time.

long period of

Findings of Fact No's 3, 7, 10, and 11. In order to overturn a Finding

of Fact, a party must first marshal all the evidence supporting the finding
and then demonstrate that when viewed in the light most favorable to the
trial court, the evidence is clearly insufficient

to support that

finding.

Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P2d at 1070; Schindler v. Schindler. 776 P2d at
88; Smith

v. Linmar Energy

Corp.. 790 P2d at 1224.

Mr. Jacobs only

contests the factual findings that separate ownership was established in
4

1973 and that the acquiescence had been for a long period of time.

He has

not marshaled any of the evidence and demonstrated that, when viewed in
the light most favorable

to the trial court, such evidence was clearly

insufficient to support these findings.

Failure of Mr. Jacobs to outline the

evidence in this fashion should be dispositive of his contest to the factual
issue. College Irr. v. Logan R and Blacksmith F.. 780 P2d 1241, 1244 (Utah
1989); Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P2d at 1070, 1071; Marchant v. Park City.
771 P2d 677, 682 (Utah App 1989).

Mr. Jacobs argues there are no facts

supporting the courts determination that eighteen-and-one-half
a sufficiently long period of time.

years was

Again, Mr. Jacobs failed to marshal any

of the evidence and show that the court was clearly erroneous.

Such facts

include the 40-50 years existence of the fence, the parties utilizing title
companies and surveyors on several occasions, no changes in the fence
being made even though 3 surveys had been done by the parties and the
unfenced open range surrounding this property.
In any event, if the 1973 deed were the only fact in evidence
concerning when ownership of the property separated, the date of this
deed would be presumed to be the operative date.

Recording of deeds is of

no import, insofar as the passing of title is concerned.
Borough

Wickwire v. City and

of Juneau. 557 P2d 783, 785 (Alaska 1976); Matter of Laue's

Estate. 225 Kan 177, 589 P2d 558, 563 (1979); Huntington City v. Peterson.
30 Utah 2d 408, 410, 518 P2d 1246 (1974).

If delivery were an issue, the

burden to establish non-delivery of the deed rested on Mr. Jacobs.
not present any evidence on the subject.

He did

Hackett v. Hackett. 429 P2d 753,

757 (Okla 1967); White v. White. 149 Colo 166, 368 P2d 417, 419 (1962);
Controlled Receivables. Inc. v. Harman. 17 Utah 2d 420, 423, 413 P2d 807
(1966).
5

B.
i.e.,

Mr. Jacobs

separate

acquiescence

ownership

was for

All

has
of

a long

other factual

contested

property

period

findings

correct and supported by the record.

only

of

two
in

factual
1973

findings,

and

that

time.

of the trial court are

presumed

Likewise, Mr. Jacobs has only argued

that one element under boundary by acquiescence has not been met, i.e.,
the

"long

period

of

time".

Therefore,

the

other

three elements

are

established by the trial court's record, i.e., (1) Occupation up to a visible
line marked by monuments, fences or buildings, (2) Mutual acquiescence
in the line as a boundary, and (3) by adjoining landowners.
C.
boundary

The

had

been

trial

court

acquiesced

correctly

in for

M

a long

concluded
period

of

that
time".

The elements of boundary by acquiescence are succinctly set
forth in Staker
elements

v.

Ainsworth. 785 P2d 417, 420 (Utah 1990).

Those

include:
1.

Occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments,

fences or buildings;
2.

Mutual Acquiescence in the line as a boundary;

3. For a long period of time;
4.

By adjoining landowners.

Mr. Jacobs has only challenged the third numbered

element.

The Supreme Court has held that a 15-year-time period is not sufficient to
establish a boundary.

The Supreme Court has pointed out that there is no

exact time requirement and that the circumstances of each case must be
considered.

However, 20 years is generally accepted as a sufficiently long

period

time

of

and

a

circumstances are shown.

lesser

period

is

sufficient

where

unusual

See Parsons v. Anderson, 690 P2d 535, 539
6

the

(Utah 1984); Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corporation. 530 P2d 792, 795
(Utah 1975).

This court reviews conclusions of law for correctness; in so

doing, the court must review "the record for the purpose of ascertaining
whether there is substantial, competent, admissible evidence to support
the conclusions reached.

If so, this court is precluded from disturbing it."

Bush v. Coult 594 P2d at 866. See also Nielsen v. Chin-Hsien Wang, 613
P2d at 514; Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P2d at 1070, 1071.
Accepted facts in this case include:
over 40-50 years, 2.

1.

the fence existed for

Mr. Jacobs' predecessors in interest had quit claimed

the property on several occasions, utilizing a title company, however had
only issued one warranty deed to the property, and that deed went to Mr.
Hafen's predecessors in interest in 1973, 3.

At least three surveys of the

property were done in the late 70?s and early 80's, 4.

The fence line

remained unchanged even though the property owners had utilized title
companies and surveyors, and 5.

This parcel of property is fenced, while

the surrounding area is unfenced open range.
The trial courts findings and subsequent conclusion that a
sufficiently long period of time had elapsed was amply supported by the
evidence, was correct, and should be upheld.
VI. ARGUMENT
A.

The trial court properly held that the ownership of

the property

became separate in 1973, and was for a long period

of

time.
The trial court made factual findings that the property had

different owners in 1973, and that the acquiescence was for a long period
of time.

See Findings of Fact No. 3, 7, 10, and 11. Mr. Jacobs argues that
7

the evidence was not sufficient to support these facts.

He argues that the

deed, while being dated April 15, 1973, was not recorded until March 28,
1983.
finding

Mr. Jacobs thus concludes the court committed error in making this
of

fact

and

likewise

argues

that

the

eighteen-and-one-half

intervening years was not a long time.
These Findings of Fact are entitled to a presumption of validity
and may not be lightly set aside.
states in part:

Rule 52 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

"Findings of Fact, whether based on oral or documentary

evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous".
v. BMG Corp.. 700 P2d at 1070;

See also; Scharf

Judd Family Limited Partnership

v.

H u t c h i n g s . 797 P2d 1088, 1090 (Utah 1990); Schindler v. Schindler. 776
P2d at 88, Smith v. Linmar Energy Corp.. 790 P2d at 1224, College Irr v.
Logan R. and Blacksmith F., 780 P2d at 1244.

These cases likewise support

the view that an appellant, when attacking factual findings, "must marshal
all

the

evidence

in

support

of

the

trial

court's

findings

and

then

demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most favorable to the court
below, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings".
Corp., 700 P2d at 1070.

Scharf v. BMG

The trial court's factual finding that the property

ownership divided in 1973 is not erroneous at all.

Mr. Jacobs' attempt to

overturn this fact falls far short of the burden he must overcome to have
this court reject this fact.

Initially, the only fact marshaled by Mr. Jacobs

is the deed dated April 15, 1973, and recorded in 1983.

No other facts are

delineated indicating other evidence the court could reasonably rely upon
in determining that 1973 was the date ownership was divided, or that it
was of a sufficiently long time.
The evidence

shows ample

courts findings.
8

and reasonable

support for

the

There

were

4

separate

warranty

deeds

executed

by

the

subsequent owners, of the property in sections 35 and 36, prior to the first
deed

of

1973 being recorded.

This logically

indicates those

owners'

assumption of their immediate rights of ownership and of the delivery of
their deeds prior to actual recording.
1.

These warranty deeds are as follows:

The deed dated April 15, 1973 from Castle Creek to E&F

Investment and Joe Hutchings. Trial exhibit 18;
2.

E&F Investment and Joe Hutchings executed 2 separate

deeds dated April 1, 1979 to Santa Clara Heights. Trial exhibits 16 and 17;
3.

Santa Clara Heights deed to Mr. Hafen, dated October 21,

1982. Trial exhibit 15;
Each of these deeds were received into evidence upon the stipulation of
counsel.

Tr. 48-50.
4.

Other evidence supporting the courts findings include:

Mr. Hafen's use of the property as his own and others use of

the property for grazing prior to his purchase, and the lack of anyone
informing Mr. Hafen he could not use the entire fenced pasture property.
Tr. 46-47, 53-54.
objection

The taking possession of and using property, without

of neighbors or others, is reasonable evidence of

immediate

delivery of the deeds and of the acquiescence in the boundary line.
5.

The fence line had been in existence for 40-50 years.

Findings of Fact 3 and 5.

Naturally, it takes 2 different property owners to

acquiesce in a boundary.

However, the long time existence of this fence

prior to the actual division of the property, accompanied by the original
owner
grantees

conveying

one

parcel

use and possession

away

and

thereafter

not

contesting

his

of the property within the fence line, is

reasonable support for the court's finding of acquiescence for a long time.
6.

Three surveys had been done on the property.
9

Findings of

Fact No. 8.

No challenge to the fence line or ownership was asserted, even

though the surveys were done, and corners, quarter corners, etc. were
established.
7.
even

though

surveyors.

The parties did not take action to change the fence line,
they

had

utilized

the

services

of

title

companies

and

Findings of Fact No. 9.
8.

The property was fenced as a pasture and the surrounding

land was unfenced, open range. Tr. 43-44.
this was the only fence around.

Together with point 5 above,

It is apparent that all associated with the

property simply accepted it as the boundary, especially after 1973, when
the property in sections 35 and 36 was conveyed to others.
accepted as such - open.
the

area,

use

the

Open range is

When a fence is built, those who have access to

area,

or

have

ownership

therein,

would

naturally

presume that the particular fenced area is owned by someone and that the
fence marks that property line.

Everything else still remains open range,

unmarked by fences or boundaries of any kind.
9.

Mr.

Hafen

had

never

been

advised

of

any

disputes

concerning the fence line or of his full use of the pasture property. Tr. 4647, 53-54.
10.

Mr. Hafen building a house on the property. Tr. 46.

The property was reconveyed by subsequent owners on several
occasions prior to the actual recording of the first deed.

The act of

ownership, wherein a party conveys away his rights, and does so by
warranty

deed

himself,

is

reasonable

evidence

that

the

1973

deed

transferred ownership at that time and not at a point after three owners
have already conveyed the property again.

The owners use and possession

of the property, prior to the recording of the deeds is also reasonable
10

evidence that title passed at the time of the date of the deed and not upon
recording.

See, 23 Am Jur 2d, Deeds §§ 159, 163 (grantees possession of

the deed or of the property creates a strong presumption of delivery of the
deed).
listed

The number of different owners, the multiple surveys and other
evidence

Indeed,

show the reasonableness

of the trial court's

findings.

such Findings are clearly correct, not erroneous.
Mr. Hafen has not marshaled the evidence to be used as a sword

against him in aid of Mr. Jacobs' appeal.

The recitation of these items of

evidence, however, do show that if Mr. Jacobs had marshaled the evidence,
the

trial

courts

factual

findings

were

still

based

upon

reasonable,

competent testimony and should be upheld.
By analogy, Mr. Jacobs' argument, is procedurally the same as in
the Scharf v. BMG Corp., case and should be dealt with in a similar fashion.
Therein, the court stated:
Erickson makes numerous arguments based on the facts
as he presented them to the trial court, rather than on the
facts as found by that court. However, at no point does he
even discuss the detailed findings entered by the lower
court that contradict his factual assertions. With respect
to these matters, we take as our starting point the trial
court's findings....
The court then set forth the standard of review and the need to marshal
the evidence, and then stated:
Erickson has not begun to carry that heavy burden.
Nowhere does he marshal the evidence supporting his
version of the facts, much less the evidence supporting the
trial court's findings.
Under these circumstances, we
decline to further consider Erickson's attack on the factual
findings.
Id.

at 1069-1070.
11

The

trial

court's

factual

findings,

in

all

particulars,

but

specifically relating to the passage of a long period of acquiescence and the
divergence of ownership in 1973, should be upheld as being supported by
the evidence

presented.

If the 1973 deed were the only fact in evidence concerning this
property, the date of the deed would be presumed to be the operative
date.

Courts have long held that recording of deeds is irrelevant, as far as

when title passes.
recording date.

Title passes upon delivery of the deed, not on the

Many courts have held that where the date of the deed's

execution is shown, a presumption arises that the deed was delivered on
that date.

See Wickwire v. City and Borough of Juneau, 557 P2d at 785;

Matter of Laue's Estate, 589 P2d at 563; Huntington City v. Peterson, 30
Utah 2d at 410; Gross v Gross, 781 P2d 284, 285 (Mont 1989).

The Court

in Gross v Gross, 781 P2d at 285 stated, "When a deed is executed a
presumption
strengthens

arises that delivery
that presumption.

occurred

and that recording

the deed

We conclude that this presumption

only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence."

can

(citing 23 Am Jur 2d,

D e e d s , § 172 and Controlled Receivables, Inc. v Harman, 17 Utah 2d 420,
413 P2d 807).

See also, 23 Am Jur 2d, Deeds. § 157 ("...in the absence of

evidence to the contrary, a deed is presumed to have been delivered at the
date of the instrument.

This presumption is strengthened if the date of

acknowledgment is the same as that of the deed".), § 165 ("Upon recording,
the presumption of delivery relates back to the date of the execution of the
deed".).

In Utah, a presumption arises by law, that once a deed has been

recorded, the law presumes that delivery occurred, notwithstanding
lapse

of

recording.

time

between

the

date

of

the

instrument

U.C.A. §57-4a-4(l)(d) (1953, as amended).
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and

the

date

any
of

Mr. Hafen introduced the 1973 deed (trial exhibit 18).
deed, on its face, shows that it was executed on April 15, 1973.

The

This date

appears above the grantors signatures and was written again in the notary
portion of the deed.

As it concerns the physical execution and delivery of

this deed, this was the evidence produced at trial.

Tr. 49-50.

Mr. Jacobs

argued in closing arguments that no one knew when delivery occurred and
thus the 1983 recording date should be accepted as the date of delivery.
Mr. Jacobs did not present any evidence rebutting that delivery occurred
on April 15, 1973.

It was Mr. Jacobs1 burden to establish non-delivery of

the deed, if that were in dispute.

Having not produced any such evidence,

the trial court properly could hold that the deed was delivered at the time
it was executed.

See Hackett v. Hackett 429 P2d at 757; White v. White,

368 P2d at 419; Controlled Receiveables, Inc. v. Harman, 17 Utah 2d at
423.
The 1973 deed, of course, was not the only evidence before the
trial court.
property

The other facts, concerning the subsequent owners use of the

and their own conveyance

of the property

before

recording,

bolster the trial courts holding that April 15, 1973 was the operative date
of this deed.
B.
in

dispute

Non-contested
on

this

Mr. Jacobs
committed

facts

and

conclusions

are

not

appeal.
argues

two points:

First,

error when it held that ownership

separate in
passed.

issues,

that

the trial

of the property

court
became

1973 and second, that a long period of acquiescence

had

The trial court entered several other findings, which have not

been addressed or disputed by Mr. Jacobs.

Such issues, whether they be

factual findings or legal conclusions, should not be disturbed by this court.
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In particular, 3 of the 4

elements of boundary by acquiescence have not

been challenged, i.e., occupation up to a visible line, by adjoining property
owners, and mutual acquiescence in that line as a boundary.

Having not

challenged the other facts, they should be accepted by this court as proper
and valid.
C.
boundary

The

had

been

trial

court

acquiesced

in

correctly
for

ft

a

long

concluded
period

of

that

the

time11.

The boundary by acquiescence has existed for more than 18and-one-half-years.

The first deed was dated April 15, 1973 and Mr.

Jacobs filed this action on November 4, 1991.

Record 1.

Our courts have

declared that a general time frame for boundary by acquiescence is 20
years, but that 15 years is not sufficient.

However, our court has stated

that there is no exact time requirement, and that the circumstances of each
case must be considered.

Where unusual circumstances are shown, a

lesser time period is sufficient.

See Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P2d at 420;

Hobson

Corporation, 530 P2d at 795; Parsons

v.

Panguitch

Lake

Anderson, 690 P2d at 539.

v.

The elements for a boundary by acquiescence,

as shown by the above cases include:
1.

Occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences

or buildings.
2.

Mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary.

3.

For a long period of time.

4.

By adjoining landowners.

The real legal issue presented thus rests on the element of the
eighteen-and-one-half year time period.
that such time was sufficient.

The District Court found and held

This court reviews conclusions of law for

correctness, in so doing, the court reviews "the record for the purpose of
14

ascertaining whether there is substantial, competent, admissible evidence
to support the conclusions reached.
disturbing it".

If so, this court is precluded from

Bush v. Coult 594 P2d at 866. See also. Nielsen v. Chim-

Hsien Wang. 613 P2d at 514; Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P2d at 1070.

The

factual circumstances which may have been somewhat unusual and used
to justify less than a 20-year use included:
1.

The fence had existed for 40-50 years.

2.

Mr. Jacobs' predecessors in interest, had quit claimed all of

the property on several occasions, utilizing a title company, however had
only issued one warranty deed to the property in sections 35 and 36, and
that deed went to Mr. Hafen's predecessors in interest in 1973.
3.

Three surveys were done on the property in the late 70's

and early 80?s.
4.

Property owners left the fence as it had existed, even though

they had used the services of title companies and surveyors.
5.

This parcel is fenced, while the surrounding property is

unfenced open range.
6.

Mr. Hafen built a house on the property.

7.

Several title changes occurred in the chain of title of both

parties.
The Staker v. Ainsworth Court stated,
There is no indication in the record that any predecessor
in interest behaved in a fashion inconsistent with a belief
that the fence line was the boundary.... Additionally, there
is no indication that any landowner ever notified his
neighbor of a disagreement over the true boundary.
Id. at 420-421.

The present case is consistent factually.
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In considering all

of these facts, the trial court did not err in the legal conclusion reached.
Under the correction-of-error
weigh the evidence de novo.

standard, our court does not consider and
As stated in Owen v Owen, 579 P2d 911,913

(Utah 1978), "Whether the justices of this Court, or any particular justice,
would have arrived at the same conclusion as the trial judge, or whether
some other trial judge would have done so is not the test of its validity."
Id., at 913. See also T.R.F. v Felan.
This

court has

stated

760 P2d 906, 909 (Utah App 1988).
that where

unusual circumstances

are

shown, a lesser period than 20 years can suffice to show boundary by
acquiescence.

This court has not yet defined what unusual circumstances

would be required in these situations.
above into account.

The trial court took the facts listed

One or two of the listed facts standing alone may or

may not be so unusual as to support the finding that a long period of time
had elapsed.

However, when taking all of the facts into account, it is easy

to see how the trial court determined that an acquiescence for a long time
had passed.
this case.

A few of these facts seem to be quite unusual in the context of
Mr. Jacobs 1 property in sections 1 and 2 has had at least 6

different owners during this eighteen-and-one-half year time period, 2 of
which were title companies.

Tr. 30-33, Trial exhibits 2, 4, 5, and 9.

There

were at least 3 surveys done, 2 of which were done in 1979 and 1985.
The section corner of sections 1, 2, 35, and 36 is the same location and lies
within the fenced pasture.

This last fact becomes unusual in the context of

this case because the surveyors use section corners as base points, and
such are marked as section corners on the ground.

Mr. Jacobs' surveyor

found this corner and it was marked with a USGLO Brass cap, as well as a
separate rebar and cap marker.

Trial exhibit 14.
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His survey in 1979 was

for the purpose of locating section corners. Tr. 24.

With the section marker

visible and clearly marked, the fence clearly not along the section line,
surveys having been done, and 2 title companies in the chain of Mr. Jacobs'
title, still none of the property owners challenged the fence, as it existed,
as the true boundary.

These circumstances, together with the other facts,

show that the trial court had "substantial, competent, admissible evidence
to support the conclusions reached".

The 18-1/2 years was a sufficiently

long period under the facts and circumstances of this case to prove a
boundary by acquiescence.
CONCLUSION
The trial court entered two factual findings which Mr. Jacobs
disputes.

One, that ownership of the property separated in 1973 and two,

that a long period had elapsed.

Mr. Jacobs failed to properly marshal the

evidence and show that these facts were clearly erroneous.

These facts

should not be set aside.
Mr. Jacobs argues that the evidence overall does not support a
conclusion of boundary by acquiescence, specifically as it relates to the
element of the acquiescence occurring for a long time.
Mr. Jacobs believes there are no unusual circumstances to vary
from

the general 20-year-time period to the eighteen-and-one-half

period as found

by the trial court.

The facts

show otherwise.

year
The

interrelationship of the facts in the context of this case were unusual.

The

trial court properly accepted the evidence presented, the evidence

was

substantial and

competent.

17

The conclusion

that

a boundary

by acquiescence

established was correct and should be upheld by this court.

had

been

The trial

court's judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this.

__day of

/^^oi^j^ru

, 1993.

LaMar J Winward
trd
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that I mailed four true and exact signed copies of
the above and foregoing Appellees' Brief, on this
_ day of
/^iOAjD^ri^^

, 1993 to:

Phillip L. Foremaster
247 Sugar Leo Road
St. George, Utah 84770-7944

#1J^^
LaMar J <Winward
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ADDENDUM
Warranty Deed, dated April 15, 1973 (Trial Exhibit 18)
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Judgment
Amended Judgment

Warranty Deed, dated April 15, 1973 (Trial Exhibit 18)

Recorded at Rcquett of AMJ^^-ILJI^

ll&A..

*tf)o.0..A...% M. Fee PtW %6*M.A , bCJa.a^c^uJ^..Q.^^x<^M.
By

.... D<p.

Book

County Recorder
.-ReL

1.9QJ?83

fc/o
608 South Main - St. George, Utah
84770

Mill tax notice to ...E..A. ?.. lRYl?.tment Co ? _
Joe Hutchlngs

WARRANTY DEED
CASTLE CREEK PROPERTIES, a Limited Partnership consisting of Dean R.
Jeffs, Lloyd Hayes, Fred Hugie and Larry Smith, General Partners
of

Kaysville

CONVEY

of

County of

Davis

, State of Utah, hereby

E & F INVESTMENT COMPANY, INC,, a Utah Corporation, as
to an UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF INTEREST; and JOE, HUTCHINQS,
as t o an UNDIVIDED ON&liALF INTEREST,

and W A R R A N T to

grantees
for the sum of

S t , George, Utah 84770

the following described tract
State of Utah:

grantors

310,00 & o t h e r valuable c o n s i d e r a t i o n of land in
Garfield

DOLLARS.
County, i

PARCEL 1: The W^SWi of Section 36,,Township 37 South, Range 6 West, SLB&M.
PARCEL 2; BEGINNING at the Southeast corner of Section 35, Township 37 South,
Range 6 West, SLB<ScM and running thence North 2640,0 feet to the East quarter
corner of said Section 35; thence West 208,0 feet, more or less, to the East
right-of-way line of Highway U.S, 89j thence Southerly along said right of way
line a distance of 2634,2 feet, more or less, to the South line of isaid Section
35; thence East 135.5 feet, more or less, to the £oint of beginning,
TOGETHER with two and one-half (2%) gallons per minute of water right from

Diversion Point #20, as shown on page 18, Sev1er^R1ver Decree, with the Utah
State Water Engineer.

WITNESS, the hand s of said grantors .this 15th
Signed In the Presence of

^j4^.^^S^^^^
STATE OF UTAH
County of Washington

\ ...

/_

J
On the

l%

' ' " >v \
«;.
.„.*. \ "* '. \ ' * V \
j V ' ' '* ! t».%. V?'*;
~J
•••;•'.-• .j .*
--*' ' jsst /

/JS"^

day
<*«y of

I

April,

A, D., 1973

personally

appeared before me D«an R. J e f f s and Fred J , Hugie, General
P a r t n e r s of Castle Creek P r o p e r t i e s , a
Limited P a r t n e r s h i p
the signer s of the within'Instrument/who duly acknowledged
A
to me that thay execute^ the same.
~
sward Allan C a r t e r , \ .

My Commljjion expire*

M Y J & . 1221

• O. UT

My residence Is

TITLC CO., » » \i. tOO N.. ST. OCDROC,

Notary Public

..^lb...B.?.^t..}3^JV.l9.

J

Certificate
COUNTY OF GARFIELD
STATE OF UTAH

I, /L^S

)
) SS
)

B^n./^*-

duly elected, qualified and acting County Recorder in and

for Garfield County, State of Utah, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of
^x-ovv-y ss<y: /*>0 £ £ 3
VJ/}/2-/2-/+AJ*-y
€><?&&
recorded (of filed) 2S ^ day of
/J/?^<^*/
19 83
and now of record in my office,

Book

2"7B

Page

32(&

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my.hand and affixed the seal of the
Recorder, at the city of Panguitch, Utah, this

i DEFENDANT'S i
I

EXHIBIT

I

* (& - I

?/ *'

day of

J^z^y

<^£

19 92.

^ ^ C ^

GARFIELD COUNTY RECORDER

»/

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

LAMAR J WINWARD - A3528
Attorney at Law
150 North 200 East, Suite 204
St. George, Utah 84770
(801) 628-1191

/rfcama,aq

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MARK JACOBS

;) FINDINGS OF FACT and
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
;

Plaintiff,
vs.

]

WILFORD L. HAFEN, and JoANN
B. HAFEN, his wife.

;) Civil No. 2592
]

Defendant.

]

The above entitled matter came on for trial before the Court
sitting without a jury on August 3, 1992, before the Honorable Don V.
Tibbs,

District Court Judge.

Plaintiff was present in person and

represented by counsel, Philip L. Foremaster.

The Defendant was

present in person and represented by counsel, LaMar J Winward.
The court heard the testimony of the witnesses, reviewed the
evidence submitted and being fully advised in the premises now
finds as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That the Defendants are the legal owners of property

located in Sections 1 and 2 of T 38 S, R W 6, SLBM, such property
being located in the Swapp pasture and is identified by the fence line
of the Swapp pasture.

That property is in the surveyors plat

3\

outlining the fence line on trial exhibit 1.

Said property is

approximately 1450 feet by 390 feet.
2.

The north boundary line of Section 1 and 2 is the county

line between Garfield and Kane County, Utah.
Section 2 also borders U.S. Highway 89.

The property in

The Defendants are also

owners of real property located in Garfield County being in Section
35 and Section 36, T 37 S, R 6 W, SLBM
3.

The dividing line between the properties has been

established as a fence line which has been in existence for a number
of years, being more than 40 to 50 years.

However, the property

owners have been different only since 1973 as to the Section 35, 36
and Section 1 properties.

Section 2 properties were held by other

parties in the early 70's and before.
4.

That an existing fence is located on the section 1 and 2

property and its location is described on the surveyors plat - trial
exhibit #1.
5.

The evidence at trial indicates that the fence has been in

existence for an extensive period of time, probably exceeding 40 or
50 years.
6.

The court finds that the recorded chain of title as shown

by the Garfield and Kane County records and by the deeds presented
at trial show that the property of Defendants and Plaintiffs located in
Sections 1, 35, and 36, was in common ownership in 1973, however,
the ownership was divided at that time by a warranty deed from
Castle Creek Properties, conveying the Section 35 and Section 36
property to others.
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7.

Separate ownership has been established since 1973.

The

Plaintiffs predecessors in interest have conveyed all of the subject
property by quit claim deed, back and forth with a title company,
even though they conveyed the Section 35 and 36 property to
Defendant's predecessors in interest by warranty deed in 1973.
8.

At least 3 surveys were done of the subject property in

the late 70rs and early 80's.
9.

The property owners did not take any action concerning

the existence of the fence line surrounding the Swapp pasture, even
though the owners had utilized the services of title companies and
surveyors throughout this period of time.
10.

The court finds that the fence line surrounding the Swapp

pasture was a visible line.
The Court finds that the adjacent property owners mutually
acquiesced in that fence line as a boundary.
The court finds that the fence line which was acquiesced in as
the boundary was for a sufficient period of time, being at least 18
years by the adjacent property owners.
11.

The court finds that the fence line was acquiesced by

adjacent property owners since at least 1973 as to the Section 35, 36
and Section 1 properties and for a period of time before 1973 for the
Section 2 property.
12.

The Defendants are entitled to a decree quieting title in

the property located within the fence line in Sections 1 and 2.

3L>

The Court having entered its findings of fact now enter its
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the Plaintiff is entitled to a decree and judgment of

this court quieting title on the property described in Sections 1 and 2
located within the Swapp pasture fence line and against the
Plaintiffs, which judgment should provide that the Defendant is the
owner and entitled to possession of said property and that Plaintiffs
have no right, title, or interest therein.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
DATED this _ _ / _ _ day of
&;•/?</
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1992.

Judgment

LAMAR J WINWARD - A3528
Attorney at Law
150 North 200 East, Suite 204
St. George, Utah 84770
(801) 628-1191

y^du

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARK JACOBS

;) JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

]

vs.

)

WILFORD L. HAFEN, and JoANN
B. HAFEN, his wife.

;> Civil No. 2592
;

Defendant.

]

The above entitled matter came on for trial before the Court
sitting without a jury on August 3, 1992, before the Honorable Don V.
Tibbs,

District Court Judge.

Plaintiff was present in person and

represented by counsel, Philip L. Foremaster.

The Defendant was

present in person and represented by counsel, LaMar J Winward.
The court having entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
now

therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the

Defendant, Wilford L. Hafen and Joanne B. Hafen are the owners of
and entitled to the possession of the following described real
property located in Kane County, State of Utah, located in Section 1
and 2 of T 38 S, R 6 W, SLBM, being that portion of said sections

5^

particularly described on the surveyors plat.

Said description shall

be reduced to a metes and bounds description and entered as part of
this judgment.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED the Plaintiff
has no interest whatsoever in and to the above described real
property.
DATED this

j

£vf/ei h*1.

AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING
On the 1st day of September, 1992, I mailed a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing Findings of FAct & Conclusions of Law and Judgment
to the following, postage prepaid from offices at Manti, Utah:
Mr. LaMar J. Winward
Attorney at Law
150 North 200 East
Suite 204
St. George, Utah, 84770

Mr. Phillip L. Foremaster
Attorney at Law
247 Sugar Leo Road
St. George, Utah
84770-7944

^2^<
Carole B. Mellor
6th District Administrator
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Amended Judgment

LAMAR J WINWARD - A3528
Attorney at Law
150 North 200 East, Suite 204
St. George, Utah 84770
(801) 628-1191

fH&nw
UlC/

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARK JACOBS

) AMENDED JUDGMENT
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

)
)

WILFORD L. HAFEN, and JoANN
B. HAFEN, his wife.

) Civil No. 2592
)
)

Defendant.

)

The above entitled matter came on for trial before the Court
sitting without a jury on August 3, 1992, before the Honorable Don V.
Tibbs,

District Court Judge.

Plaintiff was present in person and

represented by counsel, Philip L. Foremaster.

The Defendant was

present in person and represented by counsel, LaMar J Winward.
The court entered judgment in favor of the Defendants to certain real
property located in Kane County, State of Utah and provided by way
of said judgement that the property description be reduced to a
meets and bounds description and included as part of the judgment.
The property description having been reduced to a meets and
bounds description and the court having previously entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now therefore
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Defendant, Wilford L. Hafen and Joanne B. Hafen are the owners of
and entitled to the possession of the following described real

A<

property located in Kane County, State of Utah, located in Section 1
and 2 of T 38 S, R 6 W, SLBM, and more particularly described as
follows:
Beginning at the Northwest Corner of Section 1, Township 38
South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running
thence North 89°51f31" East 1,306.39 feet along the Section line to an
existing fence line; thence South 1°47'57" East 392.68 feet along said
fence Tine to a fence corner; thence North 87°27'59" West 897.02 feet
along a fence line to a fence corner; thence South 5°36 , 47" West 41.25
feet along a fence line to a fence corner; thence North 87o00'13" West
542.98 feet along a fence line to the Easterly right-of-way line of U.S.
Highway 89; thence North l°50'36n West 362.59 feet along said rightof-way line to the North line of Section 2, Township 38 South, Range
6 West; thence South 89°56 , 49" East 135.36 feet along said line to the
point of beginning. Containing 12.37 acres, more or less.
DATED this

Y^

day of

f,t.{*

i^\

. 1992.

District
MAILING CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that I mailed a true and exact unsigned copy
of the above and foregoing Amended Judgment, postage prepaid, on
this J_5__ day of (Zck^UL
, 1992 to:
Phillip L. Foremaster
247 Sugar Leo Road
St. George, Utah 84770-7944

Secretary
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